ABSTRACT : This paper analyzes an MX/G/1 queueing system where the server is subject to random breakdowns and the server applies the D-policy in providing the service. The steady-state queue size probability distribution is obtained using the embedded Markov chain technique. Key performance measures of the system are derived to obtain the optimal value of the threshold level D that minimizes the expected total cost per unit of time. The theoretical results are verified by special cases with published formulas.

ABSTRACT : In this paper, dynamic duopolistic Cournot models are investigated with discrete time scales under the assumption of unknown inverse demand function and linear cost. With this motivation, we consider different types of models: bounded rational duopoly, Puu's duopoly, bounded rational duopoly with delay, and bounded rational multi-team model. In these models, the firms use two important adjustment mechanism, the bounded rationality and Puu's approach, to update their quantity in each period.

ABSTRACT : In literature, several studies have been made to study conflict among duopolistic Cournot game with incomplete information. This paper attempts to investigate equilibrium stability of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly game on which cooperation may be existed among firms. Discrete time scales under the assumption of logarithmic price function and linear cost are used to build our models in the proposed games. We study here an adjustment dynamic strategy based on the so-called tit-for-tat strategy. For each model, the stability analysis of the fixed point is analyzed.

ABSTRACT : We make further attempts to investigate equilibrium stability of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly game. Our studies in this paper focus on the cooperation that may be obtained among duopolistic firms. Discrete time scales under the assumption of unknown inverse demand function and linear cost are used to build our models in the proposed games. We introduce and study here an adjustment dynamic strategy beside the so-called tit-for-tat strategy. For each model, the stability analysis of the fixed point is analyzed.

ABSTRACT : Isoelastic demand function have been used in literature to study the dynamic features of systems constructed based on economic market structure. In this paper, we adopt the so-called Cobb–Douglas production function and study its impact on the steady state of an oligopolistic game that consists of four oligopolistic competitors or firms. Briefly, the paper handles three different scenarios. The first scenario introduces four oligopolistic firms who plays rational against each other in market.

ABSTRACT: A high variance of the quality of High School Assessment System (HSAS) is posing challenges for higher education institutions to estimate the level of rigor of high school curriculum by examining students’ performance obtained through High Schools results. These results have promoted the idea of external assessment for college entry level admissions called National Assessment System (NAS).

ABSTRACT : The current paper introduces a discussion between two different scenarios of Cournot games. Based on parameters time-dependent, a price function and discrete time scale are used to establish two Cournot models. The first model which we call it the non-cooperative model portrays a competition between two firms. On the other hand, the second model that is called the cooperative model is constructed based on the tit-for-tat mechanism. For the two models, analytical and numerical studies are performed to show the comparison between them

ABSTRACT : We consider in this paper a bulk service, or quorum, queueing system. The server is unreliable and may break down while providing service. The admission to the system is controlled and some arrivals may be denied admission. The queueing process is studied and relevant performance measures, such as the mean number of customers in the system, the mean duration of the idle period, busy period, and busy cycle, are obtained. These measures are then used to design an optimal management policy for the system where the optimal quorum size is sought.